Abstract: A group of agents must defend their individual income from an external threat by pooling their efforts against it. The winner of this confrontation is determined by a contest success function where members' efforts display a varying degree of complementarity. Individual effort is costly and its cost follows a convex isoelastic function. We investigate how the success of the group in the conflict and its members' utilities vary with the degree of within-group inequality. We show that there is a natural relationship between the group's probability of victory and the Atkinson index of inequality. If members' efforts are complementary or the cost function convex enough, more egalitarianism within the group increases the likelihood of victory against the external threat. The opposite holds when members' efforts are substitutes and the cost linear enough.
Introduction
Societies and communities often have to defend from or compete with hostile outgroups. Here, we ask the following question: Are more egalitarian societies more or less likely to prevail in such confrontations?
Our results show that the answer to this question depends on the technologies of conflict. If the effort of the members of the society are substitutes, more inequality is better because inequality increases the incentives to contribute of richer members, who are the ones who have most to gain from victory. If on the contrary, efforts are complements, more egalitarian societies fare better in the confrontation. This is because all members must contribute for society to be successful in the conflict, implying that members with the lowest incentives to contribute are key. These members are the poorer members. They are the ones with the lowest stake in the fight. So the richer they are, that is, the more egalitarian the distribution of income within that society is, the more they contribute to defeat the out-group. The cost of conflict contributions plays also a crucial role. If the marginal cost of efforts increases rapidly, this deters richer members from contributing substantially. In that case, more egalitarianism makes the group more effective in the confrontation.
The relationship between egalitarianism and collective action has been subject to analysis for long now. Olson (1965) argued informally that more inequality favors collective action. Hirshleifer (1983) argued that when contributions are perfect complements inequality hinders public good provision. In the closest contribution to ours, Ray et al. (2007) showed, as we do, that egalitarianism can be welfare enhancing if contributions are complementary enough. In the literature on conflict, Esteban and Ray (2011) analyzed the impact of within-group inequality. They show that more within-group inequality makes groups more violent. In a different context, Sekeris (2010) explores the relationship between land scarcities and conflict concluding that relative land inequality is the main driving force of conflict in agrarian societies. Murshed (2010) also points out the role of poverty and inequality triggering conflicts since individuals suffering from scarcity are more prone to join violent groups.
The model

Conflict
Let us consider a group formed n > 1 members who differ in income. A member i owns a share α i > 0 of the total income of the group (net of subsistence level)
denoted by Y such that ∑ n i=1 α i = 1. Let us index members increasingly by income so α i ≤ α i+1 for i = 1, ..., n − 1.
This group is subject to the threat of an external entity that we model as a unitary agent. We will simply refer to it as the threat. Both the group and the threat are in confrontation. If the group prevails its members are able to retain their individual income y i = α i Y . If the threat wins the conflict, it appropriates the entire income of the group and its members get nothing. Both the group and the threat can invest resources in order to prevail in this confrontation. The outcome of the conflict depends on the efforts spent by each of the two sides. Denote by x = (x 1 , ..., x n ) the vector of conflict efforts made by the members of the group and denote by x o the effort made by the threat. We assume that the group's winning probability is (1) where the function (2) is called the impact function of the group (Kolmar and Rommeswinkel, 2011) . The parameter σ ≥ 0 represents the degree of complementarity between members' efforts. In the context of public good provision, similar functions have been used by Cornes (1993) and Ray et al. (2007) . On the other hand, the group Contest Success Function (CSF) in (1) has been axiomatized by Münster (2009) . It encompasses as particular cases the Tullock CSF (Tullock, 1967) when σ = 0, that would correspond to the case where efforts are perfect substitutes, and the weakest-link technology (Hirshleifer, 1983 ) when σ → ∞, which corresponds to the case where efforts are perfect complements. Then as σ increases, total effort becomes less relevant for the impact of the group than the distribution of effort.
We assume that the cost of effort is iso-elastic and of the form where ϕ ≥ 0. The value of 1 + ϕ corresponds to the elasticity of the cost of effort, and thus determines how fast the marginal cost of effort rises. Similarly for the threat. This functional form was first considered by Esteban and Ray (1999) and its properties studied in relation to the group-size paradox in Esteban and Ray (2001) . The payoff function for a group member boils down to (3) whereas for the threat it is just (4)
Inequality
Consider that the income distribution in a society is given by the vector y = (y 1 , ..., y n ). The measure of income inequality we will consider here was proposed by Atkinson (1970) which in our set up boils down to (5) The parameter ε thus embeds a normative judgment over income inequality but we treat it as a simple parameter of the functional form. Observe that A ε (0) = 0 and that so the inequality index depends only on the income of the worst-off member in the group. In the original formulation of the Atkinson index, it is always assumed that ε ≥ 0, implying y ε < ȳ. Under that assumption, the index is consistent with the following principle:
-Principle of transfers (Pigou-Dalton principle): Take two vectors y and y′, where y′ is obtained by adding ∆ > 0 to y i and substracting it from y j for j > i and such that
This principle states that when ε ≥ 0 a rank-preserving income transfer from a richer individual to a poorer individual cannot increase inequality. However, the functional form of the Atkinson index does not preclude that ε < 0. The literature on inequality measurement never considers this case since this literature implicitly assumes that inequality is not socially desirable. When ε < 0 the index becomes non-positive, with higher absolute values corresponding to higher levels of inequality. In this case thus, the index satisfies the Reversed principle of transfers, that is, given two distributions y and y′ defined as above it holds that A ε (y) < A ε (y′).
It is easy to show that for any value of ε, either positive or negative, the Atkinson index satisfies two relevant properties (Lambert, 2001 ) which will be helpful when characterizing the equilibrium of the conflict game.
-Scale invariance: For all k > 0, A ε (ky) = A ε (y).
-Principle of population: For any natural number k denote by y k the vector containing k times each and all of the elements in y. Then A ε (y k ) = A ε (y). This implies that the index remains constant when population (and incomes) are replicated or cloned.
3 The equilibrium
Existence
Let us now characterize the equilibrium of this game. A member i of the group seeks to maximize (3) taking as given the effort of other members and the effort made by the threat. Her optimal decision is characterized by the following expression (6) From this it is possible to write the relation between the optimal efforts of any two members (7) This expression give us a first indication of how the impact function and the cost function affect the distribution of efforts across members. Member's efforts become more similar the more complementary efforts are and the more convex their cost, i.e. the higher ϕ + σ. Actually, expression (6) implies that whenever ϕ + σ > 0 it cannot be a best response for a member to exert no effort if another member is exerting a positive effort. Hence, in any equilibrium, either all members or no member are contributing. There are, however, two exceptions to this result: the Tullock contest (Tullock, 1967) and the Weakest-link technology (Hirshleifer, 1983) . For the sake of exposition we assume that ϕ + σ > 0 and focus on fully interior equilibria.
On the other hand, the optimal effort choice for the threat is given by the following FOC (8) We are finally in the position to state our first result Proof First, we need to show that (6)-(8) characterize local maxima of the maximization problem faced by member i and the external threat respectively. For the threat, the SOC holds if which is always the case. For the problem of a member i, the SOC is satisfied if (10) where in order to ease notation H = h(x,n) + x o . Simple calculus shows that which implies that (6) holds strictly whenever σ + ϕ > 0 and there is at most one value of x i that solves this equation for any given x −i and x o . ■ This Proposition demonstrates that: members' effort contributions are nondecreasing in their income, i.e. t i y i > t j y j for all i > j. Richer members have a higher marginal benefit from contributing to the success of the group and hence exert more effort. On the other hand, observe that members contribute a share t i of their income. The presence of an external conflict is thus taxing members implicitly. This implicit tax t i is not raised by any authority. It is paid voluntarily by members in order to defend their incomes.
From here, and using simple algebra, it is possible to state one of our main results.
Proposition 2 The group's equilibrium winning probability is (11)
where Proof Combining the expressions (7) and (5), it is possible to write the equilibrium winning probability of the group as On the other hand, note that given (5) it is possible to write, (12) Now, define Given that, it is straightforward to rewrite the equilibrium winning probability as stated in the text of the Proposition. ■ The Proposition shows that it is possible to write relevant equilibrium variables as a function of the Atkinson index of inequality on the distribution of income within the group. For that, the inequality aversion parameter must be set as ε �. This parameter ε � is increasing both in the degree of complementarity of efforts σ and the cost elasticity of effort ϕ and ranges between −∞ and 2. Once we know the functional relationship between inequality and success in the conflict we can perform comparative statics.
Comparative statics
Let us first analyze the question of how the level of inequality within the group affects its chances of prevailing over the external threat. To do so we use income transfers as a natural way of comparing distributions in terms of their inequality. We say that a transfer is progressive (regressive) when it is made from an indi-vidual i to an individual j such that i > (<)j and such that the relative ranking of these two individuals remains unchanged after the transfer.
Proposition 3
Given two distributions of income y and y' such that y' can be obtained after a sequence of progressive transfers, the group's winning probability p* is lower under y than y' if and only if ε � ≥ 0.
The proof of this result is immediate from inspection of (11) and after using the fact that the Atkinson index of inequality is consistent with the Principle of transfers if and only if ε � ≥ 0. This proposition shows that when members efforts are substitutable enough or the cost of effort is linear enough, so ε � < 0, more unequal communities fare better in conflict. On the other hand, when efforts are complementary enough and the cost of effort is convex enough, i.e. ε � ≥ 0, more egalitarian societies have a higher chance of prevailing over the external threat.
The intuition for this result is easy to grasp: Complementarity of efforts discourages free-riding. All members must contribute if the group wants to have a fair chance of defeating the threat. Poorer members are the ones who have less to gain from victory. Hence, the higher their income share, that is, the more egalitarian the group is, the more they contribute. When efforts are substitutes, poorer members can free-ride in richer members who have more at stake in the conflict. So the higher the income share of the richer members the higher their efforts.
Regarding the cost, the more convex it becomes the less willing members are to contribute a substantial amount of effort. This deterrent effect is especially strong for richer members who will shy away from making high contributions. More egalitarianism weakens this effect and helps the success of the group.
The properties of the Atkinson index allow us to perform some additional comparative statics
Proposition 4
The group's equilibrium winning probability p* decreases (i) When members of the group are replicated if and only if ϕ < 1; (ii) With the degree of complementarity of members' efforts σ.
Proof
For part (i) we use the Principle of population of the Atkinson index. If the population is replicated the index remains invariant. We thus only need to check the term in the denominator of (11). It is clear to see that this term is increasing in n (and hence p* is decreasing in n) if and only if ϕ < 1.
For part (ii) note that the parameter σ only appears in A ε � (y). Recall that p* is decreasing in A ε � (y). Given that for a given income distribution, the index is increasing in the inequality aversion parameter ε � and that ε � is increasing in σ, the winning probability p* decreases as σ increases. ■ Esteban and Ray (2001) obtain that when the cost of conflict effort is convex enough, bigger groups are more effective in conflict, and the so-called "group size paradox" (Olson, 1965 ) is reversed. In our set up, increasing the size of the group is not a straightforward comparative statics exercise because the income distribution within the group changes as well. We are able to obtain an analogous result by employing the Principle of population and the Atkinson index: If the population is replicated, and so their income, the Atkinson index does not change, so any change in the winning probability is due to the direct change in n.
Part (ii) of the Proposition shows that when efforts are substitutes, that is, σ is relatively low, poorer members can free-ride on the efforts of richer members who have more at stake in the conflict. When efforts become more complements however, all members need to contribute in order to ensure that the group has a chance of prevailing against the threat. This incentivizes poorer members to contribute more. But these are precisely the members that have less to gain from winning the conflict. The success of the group thus rests more on poorer members, whose effort is less intense than those of richer members, making the group less effective.
Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that egalitarian societies are more likely to prevail in a confrontation against an external threat if the effort of their members are complementary. This technology encompasses cases such as military secrecy, defence of fortifications or modern armies where strength is very related to the lowest effort made by members of society. Given that technology, egalitarianism increases the chances of the group prevailing in the conflict because it increases the stakes of the poorer members. On the other hand, unequal societies are more effective in conflict when efforts of their members are substitutes. This scenario encompasses cases such as lobbying or the use of small mercenary armies. In this case, the community is more successful as richer members get richer because they have bigger stakes in the conflict.
We characterized the relationship between within-group inequality and conflict expenditures as a function of the Atkinson index of inequality. This allowed us to express equilibrium variables as a function of the degree of within-group inequality in a transparent manner and to exploit the properties of the index when performing comparative statics. For a given distribution of income, more complementarity of efforts is bad for the community because the success of the group rests on those individuals who have the lowest incentives to contribute. On the other hand, society can obtain an advantage in conflict as it becomes bigger provided that the cost of conflict is convex enough. This is in line with previous results (Esteban and Ray, 2001) showing that convexity of the cost is key for groups to overcome the group size paradox (Olson, 1965) .
